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Abstract
Envy-freeness is one of the most widely studied notions in fair division. Since envy-free allocations
do not always exist when items are indivisible, several relaxations have been considered. Among
them, possibly the most compelling concept is envy-freeness up to any item (EFX). We study the
existence of EFX allocations for general valuations. The existence of EFX allocations is a major
open problem. For general valuations, it is known that an EFX allocation always exists (i) when
n = 2 or (ii) when all agents have identical valuations, where n is the number of agents. it is also
known that an EFX allocation always exists when one can leave at most n − 1 items unallocated.
We develop new techniques and extend some results of additive valuations to general valuations
on the existence of EFX allocations. We show that an EFX allocation always exists (i) when all
agents have one of two general valuations or (ii) when the number of items is at most n + 3. We also
show that an EFX allocation always exists when one can leave at most n − 2 items unallocated. In
addition to the positive results, we construct an instance with n = 3 in which an existing approach
does not work as it is.
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1 Introduction
Fair division of items among competing agents is a fundamental and well-studied problem in
Economics and Computer Science. We are given a set M of m items and a set N of n agents
with individual preferences. Each agent i has a valuation function vi : 2M → R≥0 for each
subset of items. The goal is to distribute items among n agents in a fair and efficient manner.
In this paper, we consider the indivisible setting: an item cannot be split among multiple
agents. Let an allocation X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) denote a partition of M into n bundles such
that Xi is allocated to agent i. Several concepts of fairness have been considered in the
literature, and one of the most well-studied notions of fairness is envy-freeness. An allocation
X is envy-free if for any pair of agents i, j we have vi(Xi) ≥ vi(Xj), i.e., no agent i envies
another agent j’s bundle. Unfortunately, envy-free allocations do not always exist when
items are indivisible. We can easily see this even with two players and a single item having
positive value for both of them: one of the agents has to receive the item and the other agent
envies her. This motivates the study of relaxations of envy-freeness.
The most compelling relaxations of envy-freeness is envy-freeness up to any item (EFX)
introduced by Caragiannis et al. [14]. An allocation X is EFX if for any pair of agents i, j
and for any g ∈ Xj we have vi(Xi) ≥ vi(Xj \ {g}), i.e., no agent i envies another agent
j after the removal of any item in j’s bundle. EFX is regarded as the best analogue of
envy-freeness in discrete fair division: Caragiannis et al. [13] remarked that “Arguably, EFX
is the best fairness analog of envy-freeness for indivisible items.” However, the existence of
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EFX allocations is known only in a few cases. As described in [14], “Despite significant
effort, we were not able to settle the question of whether an EFX allocation always exists
(assuming all goods must be allocated), and leave it as an enigmatic open question.”
For general valuations, i.e., each valuation function vi is only assumed to be normalized
and monotone, Plaut and Roughgarden [31] showed that an EFX allocation always exists (i)
when n = 2 or (ii) when all agents have identical valuations. Furthermore, it was shown in [31]
that exponentially many value queries may be required to identify EFX allocations even in
the case where there are only two agents with identical submodular valuation functions. It is
not known whether EFX allocations always exist even when n = 3 for general valuations.
For additive valuations, i.e., each valuation function vi is normalized, monotone, and
additive1, it is known that an EFX allocation always exists when n = 3 [16] or all agents
have one of two valuations [30]. It is not known whether EFX allocations always exist even
when n = 4 for additive valuations.
One of relaxations of EFX is EFX with charity introduced by Caragiannis et al. [13].
This is a partial EFX allocation, where all items need not be allocated to the agents. Thus
some items may be left unallocated. On the other hand, an allocation is said to be complete
if all items are allocated. For general valuations, Chaudhury et al. [18] showed that there
exist a partial EFX allocation and a set of unallocated items U such that no agent envies U ,
and |U | ≤ n− 1. For additive valuations, Caragiannis et al. [13] showed that there exists a
partial EFX allocation where every agent receives at least half the value of her bundle in an
optimal Nash social welfare allocation2. Quite recently, Berger et al. [8] showed that when
n = 4, there exists an EFX allocation with at most one unallocated item such that no agent
envies the unallocated item. Moreover, they extend their results and existing results in [16]
and [30] beyond additive valuations to nice cancelable valuations which is a class including
additive, unit-demand, budget-additive, multiplicative valuations, and so on.
1.1 Our Contributions
We investigate the existence of EFX allocations for general valuations, i.e., the valuation
of each agent is not necessarily additive. To prove the existence of EFX, we iteratively
construct an EFX allocation from an existing partial EFX allocation to advance with respect
to a certain potential function. Chaudhury et al. [16] introduced the lexicographic potential
function in order to show that they could advance an allocation while keeping EFX. We use
not only the lexicographic potential function but also a new potential function, which we
call partition leximin potential function. When we construct a new EFX allocation, which is
better than the previous one with respect to the potential function, some agent may become
worse off than in the previous allocation. The problem is that such an agent may become to
envy other agents, which results in violating EFX. Our technical contribution is to develop a
new technique to avoid such situations (see Section 1.2).
Using this new technique, we obtain some new results on the existence of EFX. Our
results are described below, and are summarized in Table 1. Our first result is for the case
where each agent has one of two given valuations. The following theorem extends the case
when all agent have the identical valuations [31].
▶ Theorem 1. There exists a complete EFX allocation when each agent has one of two
general valuations.
1 A valuation function vi is additive if vi(S) =
∑
g∈S vi({g}) for any S ⊆ M .
2 This is an allocation that maximizes Πni=1vi(Xi).
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It is known that there exists an EFX allocation when each agent has one of two additive
valuations [30]. Berger et al. [8] extended this result beyond additive valuations to nice
cancelable valuations. In [30] and [8], to prove the result they iteratively construct a
Pareto dominating (see Section 2.1) EFX allocation from an existing partial EFX allocation.
However, such an approach is not likely to work for general valuations. To prove Theorem 1,
we introduce a new potential function (partition leximin potential function) and show that for
any EFX allocation with at least one unallocated item, one can obtain a new EFX allocation
that makes progress with respect to the partition leximin potential function. This implies
that there exists a complete EFX allocation. More details are discussed in Section 4.
Our second result concerns EFX with charity. As mentioned above, it is known that
there exist a partial EFX allocation and a set of unallocated items U such that no agent
envies U , and |U | ≤ n− 1 [18]. The following theorem strengthens the bound on the number
of unallocated items from n− 1 to n− 2.
▶ Theorem 2. For general valuations, there exists an EFX allocation X with at most n− 2
unallocated items. Moreover, no agent envies the set of unallocated items in X.
Berger et al. [8] showed that for nice cancelable valuations, there exists an EFX allocation X
with at most n−2 unallocated items. Theorem 2 extends this results to general valuations. To
prove Theorem 2, we show that for any EFX allocation with at least n− 1 unallocated items,
one can obtain a new EFX allocation that makes progress with respect to the lexicographic
potential function. This implies that there exists an EFX allocation with at most n − 2
unallocated items.
We also study the case with a small number of items. For additive valuations, Amanatidis
et al. [3] showed that when m ≤ n+ 2, there exists an EFX allocation. For general valuations,
to the best of our knowledge, non-trivial results are not known. The following theorem
extends the existing results in the sense that it not only increases the number of items, but
also makes valuation function general instead of additive.
▶ Theorem 3. For general valuations, there exists a complete EFX allocation when m ≤ n+3.
To prove Theorem 3, we also use the lexicographic potential function.
In addition to the above positive results, we study a limitation of the approach using
the lexicographic potential function. We construct an instance with n = 3 and m = 7 in
which there exists an EFX allocation with one unallocated item such that no progress can
be made with respect to the lexicographic potential function. This shows that Theorem 2
and Theorem 3 are the best possibilities in a sence.
Table 1 Our positive EFX results, where |U | is the number of unallocated items.
Setting Prior results Our results
EFX for one of two valuations Additive [30], Nice cancelable [8] General
EFX with charity General, |U | ≤ n − 1 [18]Nice cancelable, |U | ≤ n − 2 [8] General, |U | ≤ n − 2
EFX for a small number of items Additive, m ≤ n + 2 [3] General, m ≤ n + 3
1.2 Our Techniques
We first fix a potential function ϕ for all allocations. For an existing partial EFX allocation,
in order to find a new EFX allocation we use the champion graph introduced in [16]. If
we have a Pareto improvable cycle (see Definition 7) in the champion graph, then we can
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conclude that there exists an EFX allocation Y Pareto dominating X. That is, we have
vi(Yi) ≥ vi(Xi) for any agent i, and vj(Yj) > vj(Xj) for some agent j. It would imply that
ϕ(X) < ϕ(Y ). Otherwise, it may no longer be possible to Pareto dominate X. Thus, we seek
an allocation Y such that some agent i is worse off than in X and every agent other than i is
not worse off than in X, i.e., vi(Yi) < vi(Xi) and vj(Yj) ≥ vj(Xj) for j ∈ N \ {i}. We choose
such an agent i who is less important with respect to ϕ. In order to preserve EFX, we list
bundles that can appear in Y . We then allocate to agent i the best of the bundles in such a
list, which is a key ingredient in our construction. Since agent i receives the most favorite
bundles in Y , agent i does not envy any agent in Y . We can conclude that ϕ(X) < ϕ(Y ) or
the structure of the campion graph in Y is better than in X. In the latter case, we will find
a Pareto improvable cycle in the campion graph of Y , and obtain a new EFX allocation Y ′
such that ϕ(X) < ϕ(Y ′).
1.3 Related Work
Whereas fair division of divisible resources is a classical topic starting from the 1940’s [32],
fair division of indivisible items has been actively studied in recent years. One of the most
popular relaxations of envy-freeness is envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) where no agent
envies another agent after the removal of some item from the other agent’s bundle. While the
existence of EFX allocations is open, it is known that there always exists an EF1 allocations
for any number of agents, and it can be computed in polynomial time [29]. There are a lot
of studies on EF1 and EFX [1, 7–9, 13, 14, 16–18,30, 31]. Another major concept of fairness is
maximin share (MMS), which was introduced by Budish [11]. It was shown in [26] that MMS
allocations do not always exist, and there have been several studies on approximate MMS
allocations [2,6, 10,11,21,23,24,26]. In addition, study on finding efficient fair allocations
has attracted attention. Pareto-optimality is a major notion of efficiency. Caragiannis et
al. [14] showed that any allocation that has maximum Nash social welfare is guaranteed to
be Pareto-optimal and EF1. Unfortunately, finding an allocation with the maximum Nash
social welfare is APX-hard [27]. There are several studies on approximation algorithms for
maximizing Nash social welfare [4, 5, 7, 15,19–22,28].
There are many real-world scenarios where items or resources need to be divided fairly,
e.g., taxi fare division, rent division, task distribution, and so on. Spliddit (www.spliddit.org)
is a fair division website, which offers a fair solution for the division of rent, goods, and
credit [25]. This website implements mechanisms for users to log in, define what is to be
divided, enter their valuations, and demonstrate fair division. Since its launch in 2014, there
have been several thousands of users [14]. For more details on Spliddit, we refer to the reader
to [25,31]. Another fair division application is Course Allocation used at the Wharton School
at the University of Pennsylvania to fairly allocate courses among students [12,31].
1.4 Organization
In Section 2, we present the model, denote some basic notions introduced by [16,18], and
prove some useful lemmas. In Section 3, we consider EFX with charity for general valuations,
and prove Theorem 2. In Section 4, we consider the setting with only one of two types of
general valuations, and prove Theorem 1. In Section 5, we construct an instance with n = 3
and m = 7 that shows a certain limitations of the approach of the lexicographic potential
function. The proofs of other results are given in the full version.
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2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of n agents and M be a set of m items. In this paper, we assume
that items are indivisible: an item may not be split among multiple agents. Each agent
i ∈ N has a valuation function vi : 2M → R≥0. We assume that (i) any valuation function
vi is normalized: vi(∅) = 0 and (ii) it is monotone: S ⊆ T implies vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) for any
S, T ⊆ M .
To simplify notation, we denote [k] by {1, . . . , k}, write vi(g) instead of vi({g}) for g ∈ M ,
and use S \ g, S ∪ g instead of S \ {g}, S ∪ {g}, respectively. We also denote S <i T instead
of vi(S) < vi(T ). In a similar way, we use the symbols >i,≤i, and ≥i.
For M ′ ⊆ M , an allocation X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) on M ′ is a partition of M ′ into
n disjoint subsets, where Xi is the bundle given to agent i. We say that an allocation
X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) on M ′ is complete if M ′ = M . Otherwise, we say that an allocation
X is partial.
Given an allocation X, we say that agent i envies a set of items S if Xi <i S. We say
that agent i envies agent j if i envies Xj . We say that agent i EFX envies a set of items S
if there exists some h ∈ S such that i envies S \ h. We say that agent i EFX envies agent
j if i EFX envies Xj . Note that if i EFX envies j then i envies j, but not vice versa. An
allocation X is called envy-free if no agent envies another. An allocation X is called EFX if
no agent EFX envies another.
An instance I is a triple ⟨N,M,V⟩, where V = {v1, . . . , vn} is a set of valuation functions.
We use an assumption on instances considered in [16].
▶ Definition 4. An instance I is non-degenerate if for any i ∈ N and S, T ⊆ M ,
S ̸= T ⇒ vi(S) ̸= vi(T ).
We can show that in order to prove the existence of an EFX allocation, we may assume
w.l.o.g. that instances are non-degenerate. This assumption was considered for additive
valuations in [16], and we can easily extend it for general valuations. More details are given
in the full version. In what follows, we only deal with non-degenerate instances.
2.1 Overall Approach
All of our results on the existence of EFX can be viewed in a unified framework as follows:
we first fix an appropriate potential function ϕ on all allocations. We then show that given
any partial EFX allocation X, one can construct a new EFX allocation Y that makes
progress with respect to the potential function, i.e., ϕ(X) < ϕ(Y ). Since there are finitely
many allocations, there must exist a complete EFX allocation. One of natural potential
functions is social welfare. Given an allocation X, we denote the social welfare of X by
φ(X) =
∑
i∈N vi(Xi). A typical notion to progress the social welfare is Pareto domination.
Given two allocations X,Y , we say that Y Pareto dominates X if Yi ≥i Xi for all i ∈ N ,
and Yj >j Xj for some agent j ∈ N . Clearly, if Y Pareto dominates X, then φ(Y ) > φ(X).
Chaudhury et al. [16] have shown that there does not always exist a Pareto-dominating
EFX allocation when n = 3 for additive case. To overcome this barrier they introduce a
lexicographic potential function, which we also use to prove Theorems 2 and 3. In addition,
to prove Theorem 1, we use a new potential function. More detail on each potential function
is presented in Sections 3 and 4.
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2.2 Minimum Preferred Set and Most Envious Agent
Most envious agent is a basic notion, introduced in [18]. Consider an allocation X =
(X1, X2, . . . , Xn) and a set S ⊆ M . For an agent i such that S >i Xi, we define a minimum
preferred set PX(i, S) of agent i for S with respect to allocation X as a smallest cardinality
subset S′ of S such that S′ >i Xi. Define κX(i, S) by
κX(i, S) =
{
|PX(i, S)| if S >i Xi,
+∞ otherwise.
Let κX(S) = mini∈N κX(i, S). We define AX(S) for a set S as the set of agents with the
smallest values of κX(i, S), i.e.,
AX(S) = {i ∈ N | S >i Xi and κX(i, S) = κX(S)}.
We call AX(S) the set of most envious agents. Note that if agent i is a most envious agent
for S, it holds that i envies PX(i, S) and no agent EFX envies PX(i, S). When it is clear
from the context, we abbreviate PX(i, S) as P .
2.3 Champions and Champion Graph
In order to find a new EFX allocation from the existing partial EFX allocation, Champions
and Champion graph are important notions, introduced in [16]. Let X be a partial allocation
on M ′ ⊊M and let g ∈ M \M ′ be an unallocated item. For agents i and j (possibly i = j),
we say that i g-champions j if i is a most envious agent for Xj ∪ g. Then, we also call i a
g-champion of j. When i is a most envious agent for Xi ∪ g, we call i a self g-champion.
Note that every agent j has a g-champion. Indeed, since instances are non-degenerate, and
valuations are monotone, we have Xj ∪ g >j Xj . That is, since j envies Xj ∪ g, there exists
at least one most envious agent for Xj ∪ g.
We say that i g-decomposes j if i g-champions j, and {g} ⊊ P ⊊ Xj ∪ g, where P is a
minimum preferred set of i for Xj ∪ g. When i g-decomposes j, we can decompose Xj into
P \ g and (Xj ∪ g) \ P . If there is no ambiguity, then Tj = P \ g and Bj = (Xj ∪ g) \ P are
called top and bottom half-bundles of Xj , respectively. The following lemma illustrates a
typical situation such that i g-decomposes j.
▶ Lemma 5. If i g-champions j, i dose not envy j, and both i and j are not self g-champions,
then i g-decomposes j.
Proof. By the assumption, we have Xj <i Xi <i Xj ∪ g. Let P be a minimum preferred set
of i for Xj ∪ g. If g /∈ P , then P ⊆ Xj , and by the monotonicity, we have P ≤i Xj <i Xi.
This contradicts the definition of P . Thus, g ∈ P . If P = {g}, then κX(i,Xi ∪ g) = 1,
and hence it contradicts that i is not a self g-champion. Thus, {g} ⊊ P . Furthermore if
P = Xj ∪ g, then κX(Xj ∪ g) = |P | and hence it contradicts that j is not a self g-champion.
Therefore {g} ⊊ P ⊊ Xj ∪ g, and thus i g-decomposes j. ◀
▶ Definition 6. The champion graph MX = (N,E) with respect to allocation X is a labeled
directed multi-graph. The vertices correspond to the agents, and E consists of the following
two types of edges:
1. Envy edges: i → j iff i envies j.
2. Champion edges: i g−→ j iff i g-champions j, where g is an unallocated item.
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Envy graph which consists of only envy edges is introduced in [29]. The original champion
graph considered in [16] consists of only champion edges. Our definition of champion graph
combines these two notions for convenience. Recently, Berger et al. [8] denote the generalized
champion graph that contains more additional edges. For convenience, i → j and i g−→ j are
sometimes denoted by i ∅−→ j and i {g}−−→ j, respectively. Berger et al. [8] denote the notion of
Pareto improvable cycle, which is very useful in our argument.
▶ Definition 7. A cycle C = a1
H1−−→ a2
H2−−→ · · · Hk−1−−−→ ak
Hk−−→ a1 in MX is called Pareto
improvable (PI) if for every i, j ∈ [k] we have Hi ∩Hj = ∅, where Hi is an empty set or a
singleton of an unallocated item.
The following lemma shows that if we have a Pareto improvable cycle in MX , then there
exists an allocation Y that Pareto dominates X while keeping EFX.
▶ Lemma 8 (Berger et al. [8]). Let X be an allocation. If MX contains a Pareto improvable
cycle, then there exists an allocation Y Pareto dominating X such that for any i, j ∈ N , if i
does not EFX envy j in X, then neither in Y . In particular, if X is an EFX allocation,
then so is Y . Furthermore, every agent i along the cycle satisfies Xi <i Yi.
▶ Corollary 9. Let X be an EFX allocation. If MX contains an envy-cycle3, a self g-
champion, or a cycle composed of envy edges and at most one champion edge, then there
exists an EFX allocation Y that Pareto dominates X.
3 Existence of EFX with at most n − 2 unallocated items
In this section, we prove Theorem 2. We use a lexicographic potential function as in [16].
Recall that N = {1, . . . , n}. For an allocation X, the lexicographic potential function ϕ(X) is
defined as the vector (v1(X1), . . . , vn(Xn)). Intuitively, agent 1 is the most important agent
and agent n is the least important agent in N .
▶ Definition 10. For two allocations X,Y , We denote Y ≻lex X if ϕ(Y ) is lexicographically
larger than ϕ(X), i.e., for some k ∈ N , we have that Yj =j Xj for all 1 ≤ j < k, and
Yk >k Xk.
Note that if Y Pareto dominates X then Y ≻lex X, but not vice versa. The following basic
lemma is shown in [8], which we also use.
▶ Lemma 11 (Berger et al. [8]). If for every partial EFX allocation X with k unallocated
items, there exists an EFX allocation Y such that Y ≻lex X, then there exists an EFX
allocation with at most k − 1 unallocated items. Moreover, no agent envies the set of k − 1
unallocated items.
By Lemma 11, in order to prove Theorem 2, it suffices to show that for every partial EFX
allocation X with at least n− 1 unallocated items, there exists an EFX allocation Y such
that Y ≻lex X. We first prove the following lemma, which is used in the proof of Theorem 2.
3 envy-cycle is a dicycle in MX composed of only envy edges.
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▶ Lemma 12. Let X be an EFX allocation with at least n− 1 unallocated items. Then, there
exists an EFX allocation Y Pareto dominating X in the following two cases.
(1) the number of unallocated items is at least n.
(2) there exists at least one envy edge j → i in MX .
Moreover, in case (2), some agent l ∈ N \ i is strictly better off than in X, i.e., Yl >l Xl.
Proof. Let {g1, . . . , gk} denote the set of unallocated items. We first prove the case of (1).
It suffices to prove that there exists a PI cycle in MX by Lemma 8. Let a1 be an arbitrary
agent. Then, some agent a2 g1-champions a1. If a2 = a1, then we have a PI cycle, and we
are done. Assume that a2 ̸= a1. Then, some agent a3 g2-champions a2. If a3 = a1 or a2,
then we have a PI cycle. Indeed, in the first case we have a cycle a1
g2−→ a2
g1−→ a1, and in
the second case we have a self g2-champion. We can continue this way to conclude that
w.l.o.g. we have a directed path an
gn−1−−−→ an−1
gn−2−−−→ · · · g1−→ a1 in MX , where a1, . . . , an are
different agents. Now, some agent gn-champions an in MX . No matter who it is, there exists
a PI cycle, and we are done.
We prove the case of (2) in a similar way. Assume w.l.o.g that some agent a2 envies
a1. By a similar argument as above, we can conclude that w.l.o.g. we have a directed path
an
gn−1−−−→ an−1
gn−2−−−→ · · · g3−→ a3
g2−→ a2 → a1 in MX , where a1, . . . , an are different agents.
Now, some agent g1-champions an. No matter who it is, there exists a PI cycle, and we are
done. Moreover, in any cases, we have a PI cycle containing some agent in N \ a1. Hence,
the last statement of lemma holds by Lemma 8. ◀
We are now ready to prove Theorem 2. We fix an arbitrary ordering of the agents.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let X be an EFX allocation with k ≥ n− 1 unallocated items, and
let {g1, . . . , gk} denote the set of unallocated items. By Lemma 11, it suffices to prove
that there exists an EFX allocation Y such that Y ≻lex X. By Lemma 12, when k ≥ n,
or k = n − 1 and there exists at least one envy edge in MX , we are done. Assume that
k = n − 1 and there exists no envy edge in MX . Let a1 be the last agent in the fixed
ordering, i.e., a1 is the least important agent in the lexicographic potential function. By
a similar argument in Lemma 12, we conclude that w.l.o.g. we have a directed path
an
gn−1−−−→ an−1
gn−2−−−→ · · · g1−→ a1 in MX , where a1, . . . , an are different agents. Furthermore,
we may assume that there are no self gi-champions for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 since otherwise we
have a PI-cycle. Since there are no self-champions, and there exists no envy edge in MX ,
ai+1 gi-decomposes ai for 1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 by Lemma 5. Let Ti and Bi are the top and
bottom half-bundles of Xai decomposed by ai+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, respectively. Consider
Z = maxa1{T1 ∪ g1, T2 ∪ g2, . . . , Tn−1 ∪ gn−1, Xa2 , . . . , Xan}4. We discuss in two cases.
Case 1: Z = Ti ∪ gi or Xai for 2 ≤ i ≤ n
We define a new allocation X ′ as follows:
X ′a1 = Z,
X ′aj = Tj−1 ∪ gj−1 for 2 ≤ j ≤ i,
X ′aj = Xaj for i < j ≤ n.
We show that X ′ is EFX and X ′ ≻lex X. For 1 ≤ t ≤ i− 1, since Tt ∪ gt is a minimum
preferred set of at+1 and at+1 is a most envious agent for Tt ∪ gt, no agent EFX envies
4 maxa1 {T1 ∪ g1, T2 ∪ g2, . . . , Tn−1 ∪ gn−1, Xa2 , . . . , Xan } is a1’s most favorite bundle out of T1 ∪ g1, T2 ∪
g2, . . . , Tn−1 ∪ gn−1, Xa2 , . . . , Xan .
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Tt ∪gt in X. Thus, for 2 ≤ s ≤ n, since X ′as ≥as Xas , agent as does not EFX envy Tt ∪gt
in X ′. For 2 ≤ s ≤ n, since X is envy-free and the fact that X ′as ≥as Xas , agent as does
not envy Xau for 1 ≤ u ≤ n in X ′. By the definition of Z, a1 does not envy any agents
in X ′. Therefore, X ′ is EFX. Furthermore, for 2 ≤ j ≤ i, each agent aj is strictly better
off than in X, and each agent aj does not change her bundle for i < j ≤ n. Thus, we
have X ′ ≻lex X, and we are done.
Case 2: Z = T1 ∪ g1
We define a new allocation X ′ as follows:
X ′a1 = Z,
X ′ai = Xai for 2 ≤ i ≤ n.
We show that X ′ is EFX. Since we change only a1’s bundle from X, it is enough to check
that there is no EFX envy from or to a1. By the definition of Z, a1 does not envy any
agent in X ′. Since Z = T1 ∪ g1 is a minimum preferred set of a2 for Xa1 ∪ g1, and a2 is a
most envious agent for Xa1 ∪ g1, no agent EFX envies T1 ∪ g1 in X ′. Thus X ′ is EFX.
In addition, since Z = T1 ∪ g1 is a minimum preferred set of a2, a2 envies a1 in X ′. By
the fact that B1 ̸= ∅, we now have at least n− 1 items in {g2, . . . , gn−1} ∪B1 that are
unallocated. Thus by the case of (2) in Lemma 12, there exists an EFX allocation X ′′
that Pareto dominates X ′. Furthermore, there exists some agent ai (2 ≤ i ≤ n) such that
X ′′ai >ai X
′




aj = Xaj for 2 ≤ j ≤ n, we have X
′′ ≻lex X, and
we are done. ◀
4 Existence of EFX with One of Two General Valuations
In this section, we prove Theorem 1. For two general valuation functions va and vb,
let Na (resp. Nb) be the set of agents whose valuation is va (resp. vb). To prove The-
orem 1, we introduce a new potential function. For an allocation X, we write Na =
{a0, a1, . . . , as} and Nb = {b0, b1, . . . , bt}, where Xa0 <a Xa1 <a · · · <a Xas and Xb0 <b
Xb1 <b · · · <b Xbt . Define the partition leximin potential function ψ(X) as the vector
(va(Xa0), . . . , va(Xas), vb(Xb0), . . . , vb(Xbt)).
▶ Definition 13. For two allocations X,Y , we denote Y ≻p.lexmin X if ψ(Y ) is lexicograph-
ically larger than ψ(X).
That is, we prioritize Na over Nb, compare agents in Na by the leximin ordering, and second
compare agents in Nb by the leximin ordering. Note that if Y Pareto dominates X, then
Y ≻p.lexmin X but not vice versa. Our goal is to show the following theorem.
▶ Theorem 14. Let X be a partial EFX allocation. Then, there exists an EFX allocation Y
such that Y ≻p.lexmin X.
If Theorem 14 holds, then since there are finitely many allocations, there must exist a
complete EFX allocation, and thus Theorem 1 holds.
We say that an allocation X is semi-EFX if there can be EFX envy only among agents
belonging to Nb in X, i.e., no agent belonging to Na EFX envies any agents, and no agent
belonging to Nb EFX envies any agent belonging to Na in X. The following lemma shows
that if we have a semi-EFX allocation, then we can obtain an EFX allocation such that all
the agents in Na and b0 ∈ Nb do not change their bundles.
▶ Lemma 15. Let X be a semi-EFX allocation such that Xb0 <b Xb1 <b · · · <b Xbt . Then,
there exists an EFX allocation Y such that Yai = Xai for any agent ai ∈ Na, and Yb0 = Xb0 .
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Figure 1 The champion graph MX (the edges are only partially drawn) in the proof of Theorem 14.
Every agent other than a0 and b0 is envied by some other agents, and a0 g-decomposes b0 in MX .
Proof. If X is EFX, then the lemma obviously holds. Assume that X is not EFX. Then,
for some two agents bi, bj ∈ Nb, bi EFX envies bj in X. Thus, there exists an item h ∈ Xbj
such that Xbi <b Xbj \ h. We define a new allocation X ′ as X ′bj = Xbj \ h, and X
′
k = Xk
for any k ∈ N \ bj . Then, X ′ is also semi-EFX. Indeed, since we only change bj ’s bundle,
it suffice to consider EFX envy from or to bj . Since bj ’s bundle is a subset of Xbj , and
valuations are monotone, agents who do not EFX envy bj in X do not EFX envy bj either
in X ′. In addition, since Xbi = X ′bi <b X
′
bj
, and bi does not EFX envy any agent belonging
to Na in X, bj does not EFX envy any agent in Na either in X ′. Therefore X ′ is also
semi-EFX. Furthermore since bj is not b0, we have X ′b0 = Xb0 . If X
′ is EFX, then we are
done. Otherwise, since the number of all items allocated is decreasing, we can continue
this way to obtain an EFX allocation Y such that Yai = Xai for any agent ai ∈ Na, and
Yb0 = Xb0 . ◀
We are now ready to prove Theorem 14.
Proof of Theorem 14. Let X be a partial EFX allocation and let g be an unallocated item.
Define Na = {a0, a1, . . . , as} and Nb = {b0, b1, . . . , bt}, where Xa0 <a Xa1 <a · · · <a Xas
and Xb0 <b Xb1 <b · · · <b Xbt . If there exists a PI cycle in MX , then we are done by
Lemma 8. Assume that there is no PI cycle in MX . We first show that a0 g-decomposes
b0. By the assumption, neither a0 nor b0 is a self g-champion. If a0 envies b0, then every
agent other than a0 is envied by some other agents. Some agent g-champions a0. No
matter who it is, there exists a PI cycle in MX , and this is a contradiction. Thus, a0
does not envy b0. Now, some agent i g-champions b0. If i ∈ Nb, then since Xb0 ≤b Xi,
we have κX(b0, Xb0 ∪ g) ≤ κX(i,Xb0 ∪ g) = κX(Xb0 ∪ g). This implies that b0 is a self
g-champion, and this is a contradiction. Hence, we have i ∈ Na. Then, since Xa0 ≤a Xi,
we have κX(a0, Xb0 ∪ g) ≤ κX(i,Xb0 ∪ g) = κX(Xb0 ∪ g). Hence, a0 g-champions b0. As a
result, a0 g-decomposes b0 by Lemma 5. Therefore, Xb0 is decomposed into top and bottom
half-bundles. Let Tb0 and Bb0 be the top and bottom half-bundles of Xb0 . Figure 1 partially
illustrates MX . For 0 ≤ i ≤ s, we define Uai ⊆ Xai as follows:
Uai =
{
Xai if b0 does not envy ai in X,
X̂ai otherwise,
where, X̂ai is a maximum cardinality proper subset of Xai maximizing vb(X̂ai). Note that
we have |X̂ai | = |Xai | − 1. Consider Z = maxb{Tb0 ∪ g, Ua0 , . . . , Uas}. We define a new




Tb0 ∪ g if Z = Uai
Xai otherwise
for 0 ≤ i ≤ s,
X ′b0 = Z,
X ′bj = Xbj for 1 ≤ j ≤ t.





, . . . , X ′bt is a
partition of a subset of M . We show that X ′ is semi-EFX.
Any two agents in Na do not EFX envy each other: Note that since Xa0 <a Tb0 ∪ g and
Xa0 <a Xak for 1 ≤ k ≤ s, we have Xa0 ≤a X ′ai for 0 ≤ i ≤ s. Let ai and ai′ be two
agents in Na. If X ′ai′ = Xai′ , then since Xa0 ≤a X
′
ai and by the fact that X is EFX, ai
does not EFX envy ai′ in X ′. If X ′ai′ = Tb0 ∪ g, then since Xa0 ≤a X
′
ai and a0 does not
EFX envy Tb0 ∪ g in X, ai does not EFX envy ai′ in X ′.
Any agent in Na does not EFX envy any agent in Nb \b0: Since Xa0 ≤a X ′ai for 0 ≤ i ≤ s,
X is EFX, and any agent in Nb \ b0 does not change her bundle, any agent in Na does
not EFX envy any agent in Nb \ b0.
Any agent in Na does not EFX envy b0: If Z = Tb0 ∪ g, then since Xa0 ≤a X ′ai for
0 ≤ i ≤ s and a0 does not EFX envy Tb0 ∪ g in X, any agent in Na does not EFX envy
b0 in X ′. If Z = Uak for some 0 ≤ k ≤ s, then since Xa0 ≤a X ′ai for 0 ≤ i ≤ s, and a0
does not EFX envy Uak ⊆ Xak , any agent in Na does not EFX envy b0 in X ′.
Any agent in Nb \ b0 does not EFX envy any agent in Na: Let ai be any agent in Na
and let bj be any agent in Nb \ b0. If X ′ai = Xai , then since X
′
bj
= Xbj and X is EFX, bj
does not EFX envy ai. If X ′ai = Tb0 ∪ g, then since b0 is not a self g-champion in X, we
have Tb0 ∪ g <b Xbj . Thus bj does not envy ai in X ′.
b0 does not EFX envy any agent in Na: Let ai be any agent in Na. If X ′ai = Tb0 ∪ g,
then since Z = maxb{Tb0 ∪ g, Ua0 , . . . , Uas} ≥b Tb0 ∪ g, b0 does not envy ai in X ′. If
X ′ai = Xai , then since Z = maxb{Tb0 ∪ g, Ua0 , . . . , Uas} ≥b Uai , for any proper subset S
of Xai , we have Z ≥b Uai ≥b S by the definition of Uai and X̂ai . Thus b0 does not EFX
envy ai in X ′.
Therefore X ′ is semi-EFX. By Lemma 15, there exists an EFX allocation X ′′ such that
X ′′ai = X
′
ai for 0 ≤ i ≤ s, and X
′′
b0
= X ′b0 . We discuss in the following three cases.
Case 1: Z = Ua0
In this case, we have X ′′a0 = X
′
a0 = Tb0 ∪ g >a Xa0 and X
′′
ak
= X ′ak = Xak for 1 ≤ k ≤ s.
Thus, we have X ′′ ≻p.lexmin X, and we are done.
Case 2: Z = Tb0 ∪ g
In this case, since we have X ′′a0 = X
′
a0 = Xa0 <a Tb0 ∪ g = X
′
b0
= X ′′b0 , a0 envies b0 in
X ′′. Thus, every agent other than a0 is envied by some other agents in X ′′. By the fact
that Bb0 ̸= ∅, there is an unallocated item g′ ∈ Bb0 . Then, some agent l g′-champions
a0 (see Figure 2). If l = ai ∈ Na, then by following agents in Na backwards we obtain a
PI cycle a0 → · · · → ai−1 → ai
g′−→ a0 in MX′′ . If l ∈ Nb, then by following agents in Nb
backwards we also obatain a PI cycle a0 → b0 → · · · → l
g′−→ a0 in MX′′ . Therefore, in
either case, there exists a PI cycle containing a0 in MX′′ . By Lemma 8, there exists an




a0 = Xa0 and X
′′′
ak




for 1 ≤ k ≤ s. Therefore, we have X ′′′ ≻p.lexmin X, and we are done.
Case 3: Z = Uar for some 1 ≤ r ≤ s
In this case, if Uar = Xar , then since we have X ′′a0 = X
′
a0 = Xa0 <a Xar = X
′
b0
= X ′′b0 ,
a0 envies b0 in X ′′. By the fact that Bb0 ̸= ∅, there is an unallocated item g′ ∈ Bb0 .
In a similar way to Case 2, the fact that some agent g′-champions a0 implies that
there exists a PI cycle containing a0 in MX′′ (see Figure 3). By Lemma 8, there
ESA 2021






Figure 2 The champion graph MX′′ (the
edges are only partially drawn) in Case 2.
Every agent other than a0 is envied by some









Figure 3 The champion graph MX′′ (the
edges are only partially drawn) in the case
where Uar = Xar in Case 3 . Every agent
other than a0 is envied by some other agents,









Figure 4 The champion graph MX′ (the
edges are only partially drawn) in the case
where Uar = X̂ar , and some agent in Na g′-








Figure 5 The champion graph MX′ (the
edges are only partially drawn) in the case
where Uar = X̂ar , and some agent in Nb g′-
champions a0 in Case 3. b0 g′-champions a0,
and a0 g′′-champions b0 in MX′ .





≥a X ′′ak for 1 ≤ k ≤ s.
Thus, we have X ′′′ak ≥a X
′′
ak
= X ′ak = Xak >a Xa0 for 1 ≤ k ≤ s with k ̸= r, and




ar = Tb0 ∪ g >a Xa0 . That is, X
′′′
ai >a Xa0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ s. Therefore, we
have X ′′′ ≻p.lexmin X, and we are done.
If Uar = X̂ar , then we consider semi-EFX allocation X ′, not X ′′ in this case. some agent
l g′-champions a0 in MX′ . If l ∈ Na, then by following agents in Na backwards we obtain
a PI cycle a0 → · · · → l
g′−→ a0 in MX′′ (see Figure 4). By Lemma 8, there exists a





≥a X ′ak for 1 ≤ k ≤ s. By a
similar argument as above, we have X ′′′ai >a Xa0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ s. By Lemma 15, there
exists an EFX allocation X ′′′′ such that X ′′′′ai = X
′′′
ai for 0 ≤ i ≤ s. Therefore, we have
X ′′′′ai >a Xa0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ s, thus we have X
′′′′ ≻p.lexmin X, and we are done.
If l = bj ∈ Nb, then since X ′b0 ≤b X
′
bj
, we have κX′(b0, X ′a0 ∪ g
′) ≤ κX′(bj , X ′a0 ∪ g
′) =
κX′(X ′a0 ∪ g
′). Thus b0 g′-champions a0 in X ′. Since Uar = X̂ar , there exists an
unallocated item g′′ ∈ Xar \ X̂ar . Note that we have Xar = X ′b0 ∪ g
′′. We claim that
a0 g
′′-champions b0 in X ′. Indeed, since any agent u ∈ N \ {ar, b0} does not change
her bundle, and X is EFX, u does not EFX envy Xar = X ′b0 ∪ g
′′ in X ′. In addition,
since X ′ar = Tb0 ∪ g >a Xa0 , and a0 does not EFX envy Xar in X, ar does not EFX
envy Xar in X ′. Furthermore, since X ′b0 = Uar = X̂ar is a maximum cardinality proper
subset of Xar maximizing vb(X̂ar ), b0 does not EFX envy Xar in X ′. To sum up, for
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any proper subset S of X ′b0 ∪ g
′′, any agent in N does not envy S in X ′. Furthermore,
since we have X ′a0 = Xa0 <a Xar = X
′
b0
∪ g′′, a0 envies X ′b0 ∪ g
′′ in X ′. Thus, since
κX′(a0, X ′b0 ∪ g
′′) = |X ′b0 ∪ g
′′| ≤ κX′(w,X ′b0 ∪ g
′′) for any w ∈ N , a0 is a most envious
agent for X ′b0 ∪ g
′′. That is, a0 g′′-champions b0 in X ′ (see Figure 5). We now have a PI
cycle a0
g′′−→ b0
g′−→ a0 in MX′ , and by Lemma 8, we obtain a semi-EFX allocation X ′′′





= X ′ak for 1 ≤ k ≤ s. By a similar argument as above,
we have X ′′′ai >a Xa0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ s. By Lemma 15, there exists an EFX allocation X
′′′′
such that X ′′′′ai = X
′′′
ai for 0 ≤ i ≤ s. Therefore, we have X
′′′′
ai >a Xa0 for 0 ≤ i ≤ s, thus
we have X ′′′′ ≻p.lexmin X, and we are done. ◀
5 Limitations of the Lexicographic Potential Function
In Section 3, in order to prove the existence of EFX, we show that given a partial EFX
allocation X, there exists an EFX allocation Y such that Y ≻lex X. Recently, Chaudhury et
al. [17] have shown that there does not always exist a lexicographically larger EFX allocation
when n = 4 for additive valuations. In this section, we show that there does not always
exist a lexicographically larger EFX allocation when n = 3 for general valuations. Thus, the
approach using the lexicographic potential funtion is not sufficient to show the existence of
EFX even when n = 3 for general valuations.
The following theorem shows that there exist an instance and a partial EFX allocation
X such that no complete EFX allocation Y such that Y ≻lex X.
▶ Theorem 16. There exist an instance I with three agents, {1, 2, 3} with general valuations,
seven items {gi | i ∈ [7]}, and a partial EFX allocation X, such that in every complete EFX
allocation, the valuation of agent 1 will be strictly worse off than in X.
Proof. We partially define the conditions of each agent’s valuation function. Assume that
agent 1 has an additive valuation satisfying the following conditions: v1(g1) = v1(g2) >
0, v1(gi) = 0 for 3 ≤ i ≤ 7. Agent 2 has a general valuation satisfying following four
conditions:
(1) {gi} <2 {g1} for 2 ≤ i ≤ 7
(2) {gi, gj} <2 {g1} for 2 ≤ i < j ≤ 7 and (i, j) ̸= (3, 4), (5, 7)
(3) {g4, g5, g6} <2 {g1} <2 {g3, g4} <2 {g5, g7}
(4) {g5, g7} <2 {g1, gi} for 2 ≤ i ≤ 7
Similarly, agent 3 has a general valuation satisfying the following four conditions:
(1’) {gi} <3 {g1} for 2 ≤ i ≤ 7
(2’) {gi, gj} <3 {g1} for 2 ≤ i < j ≤ 7 and (i, j) ̸= (5, 6), (3, 7)
(3’) {g3, g4, g6} <3 {g1} <3 {g5, g6} <3 {g3, g7}
(4’) {g3, g7} <3 {g1, gi} for 2 ≤ i ≤ 7
Note that all conditions do not violate the monotonicity of valuation functions. We now
consider a partial allocation X = ({g1, g2}, {g3, g4}, {g5, g6}). We can easily check that X
is an EFX allocation. Consider any complete EFX allocation Y . We show that Y1 <1 X1.
Assume that X1 ≤1 Y1. Then, it must be {g1, g2} ⊆ Y1 by the definition of 1’s valuation.
If {g1, g2} ⊊ Y1, then at least one of agents 2 and 3 has a bundle of size at most 2. If
|Y2| ≤ 2, then since Y2 <2 {g1, g2} by (2), (3), and (4), agent 2 EFX envies agent 1. This is
a contradiction. The similar argument holds when |Y3| ≤ 2. Thus, we have Y1 = {g1, g2}.
Therefore, by (1) and (1’), both agent 2 and agent 3 have bundles of size at least 2. This
implies that |Y2| = 2 and |Y3| = 3, or |Y2| = 3 and |Y3| = 2.
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If |Y2| = 2 and |Y3| = 3, then since agent 2 does not EFX envy agent 1, Y2 = {g3, g4}
or {g5, g7} by (2). If Y2 = {g3, g4} then Y3 = {g5, g6, g7}, and agent 2 EFX envies agent 3
by (3). This is a contradiction. If Y2 = {g5, g7} then Y3 = {g3, g4, g6}, and agent 3 EFX
envies agent 1 by (3’). This is a contradiction. The similar argument holds when |Y2| = 3
and |Y3| = 2. As a result, we conclude that Y1 <1 X1, and thus the value of agent 1 will be
strictly worse off than in X. ◀
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